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 Is Naturalism Bleak? A Reply to Holland and
 Cottingham1
 IAN JAMES KIDD
 Department of Philosophy, Durham University
 50 Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HN, UK
 Email: i J. kidd@durham. ac. uk
 ABSTRACT
 Although Cottingham and Holland make a persuasive case for the claim that
 it is difficult to situate a meaningful life within a Darwinian naturalistic cos-
 mology, this paper argues that their case should be modified in response to
 the apparent fact that certain persons seem genuinely not to experience the
 'bleakness' that they describe. Although certain of these cases will reflect an
 incomplete appreciation of the existential implications of Darwinian natural-
 ism, at least some of those cases may be genuine. The resulting possibility that
 certain persons can embrace Darwinian naturalism and live meaningful lives
 in apparent immunity to the 'bleakness charge' therefore poses new puzzles for
 Cottingham and Holland, and for wider questions about the meaningfulness of
 human life. I consider that possibility in light of the work of David E. Cooper
 and Paul Feyerabend and offer a set of three suggestions for further developing
 these debates.
 KEYWORDS
 Cottingham; Holland; bleakness; contingency; existential response; meaning;
 naturalism.
 INTRODUCTION
 In a recent exchange in this journal, John Cottingham and Alan Holland
 have discussed the moral and existential problems generated by 'Darwinian
 naturalism'.2 Those problems cluster around what one might call the 'bleak-
 1. I offer my thanks to Alan Holland and an anonymous journal referee for very helpful com-
 ments on this article.
 2. See Cottingham 201 1 and Holland 2009.
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 ness' charge: that Darwinian naturalism describes a world marked by brute
 contingency, alienation, and randomness in a way that jeopardises the pos-
 sibility of one's living a genuinely meaningful life within it. Although their
 concerns about the 'bleakness' of Darwinian naturalism are well-taken, I argue
 that certain modifications need to be made to Cottingham's and Holland's
 accounts of it. Those modifications reflect an important problem for their po-
 sition, which, stated bluntly, is that not everyone finds Darwinian naturalism
 'bleak', and, indeed, some find it positively liberating and wholly capable of
 sustaining a morally vigorous and deeply meaningful life. My questions, then,
 are whether those persons are right to reject the bleakness charge, and, if so,
 what implications that has for Cottingham's and Holland's concerns.
 1 . BLEAKNESS - FOR AND AGAINST
 The problem of 'bleakness' is existential in nature. An existential concern is
 one concerned with issues about the meaningfulness and purposiveness of
 human life - whether one's own, others or in general. Such concerns arise be-
 cause human beings are, as David E. Cooper puts it, ' inveterate ly teleological
 creatures', necessarily engaged in 'purposive activity, in the pursuit of goals'.3
 Bleakness arises when one judges that those teleological needs will go unsatis-
 fied, perhaps forever, since the world offers no basis for their satisfaction. For
 that which is bleak - whether it be a film, a novel or a whole world - provides
 neither inspiration to engage in meaningful activities, nor a basis upon which
 to find goals attractive or enticing, nor perhaps any sense of a life being mean-
 ingful at all. The deepest sorts of bleakness might even rob a person of their
 very sense of the possibility of activities and goals being meaningful and pur-
 poseful.4 A person possessed of a deep sense of the bleakness of the world is,
 as Bernard Williams put it, robbed of that 'motive force which propels him into
 the future and gives him a reason for living' - hence Cottingham and Holland's
 strongly evaluative language of alienation, despair and so on.5
 Such existential responses are, quite clearly, powerful for those who expe-
 rience them. But the point which concerns me here is that existential responses
 to Darwinian naturalism vary, quite considerably, and the related suggestion
 that the 'bleakness charge' ought to incorporate it. Two specific points should
 be drawn. The first is that certain persons simply do not regard the picture of
 human beings and the world offered by Darwinian naturalism to be bleak;
 some find it invigorating and liberating - indeed, one of 'grandeur', as Darwin
 himself put it.6 Understanding those divergent responses is an important task
 3. Cooper 2002, p. 261.
 4. See Ratei iffe 2012.
 5. Williams 1981, p. 13.
 6. Darwin 1 859 [2009], p. 429.
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 for those, like Cottingham and Holland, who advance forms of the bleak-
 ness charge, and also to wider debates concerning the existential adequacy of
 naturalism.7
 The second is that the fact of divergent existential responses to Darwinian
 naturalism poses a puzzling question, namely why such veiy different re-
 sponses exist and whether they are legitimate or not. This question is less of a
 puzzle for Holland, for whom 'the conditions for the living of a worthwhile life
 are really quite minimal', than for Cottingham, who requires more demanding
 conditions, such as a theistic conviction of the 'ultimate triumph of the good'.8
 My suggestion is that the 'bleakness' which Cottingham and Holland perceive
 in the Darwinian world-picture is not necessarily shared by all persons, and
 that consideration of those informed and reflective persons for whom no such
 sense of impoverishment or 'bleakness' apparently obtains may be instructive.
 These two points converge in the idea that differing existential responses to
 Darwinian naturalism might help us to better understand how and why certain
 persons can, or indeed can't, find the world, and lives led within it, as mean-
 ingful and existentially nourishing. It seems clear that many persons do regard
 naturalistic cosmologies as 'disenchanting' or 'bleak', for, as David E. Cooper
 has suggested, a world 'stripped of . . . purpose and beauty' may leave us with
 nothing which could 'serve to guide our activities', for swirling particles and
 impersonal laws of nature offer no 'measure' by which the meaningfulness of
 our activities could be determined.9 But of course, not everyone regards natu-
 ralistic cosmologies in this 'bleak' manner. So for Richard Dawkins, 'this view
 of life . . . bleak and cold though it can seem [affords] deep refreshment', while
 for the astronomer Margaret Geller, the fact the universe is 'just a physical
 system' elicits no despair, and she in fact dismisses the question of whether it
 has a meaning or purpose: '[i]t's not clear that it matters'.10
 Since I am willing, at least for now, to take them seriously, it seems that
 the existential responses expressed in the bleakness charge simply do not hold
 for all persons. Dawkins and other naturalists clearly do not experience the
 'bleakness' which Cottingham and Holland report; instead, as they seem to
 experience something like a 'feeling of awed wonder' and a 'deep aesthetic
 passion' which, as Dawkins puts it, 'makes life worth living'.11 Those who
 share the 'feelings' and 'passions' described by Dawkins are perhaps best de-
 scribed as cheerful naturalists because they are those for whom no sense of
 bleakness arises, and for whom, indeed, a sense of cheerfulness obtains.
 Those feelings and passions are, it seems, sufficient to sustain the needs
 of these naturalists, as evidenced by Geller 's puzzlement at the very idea of
 7. See Kidd 2013a.
 8. Holland 2011, p. 317.
 9. Cooper 2002, p. 56.
 10. Dawkins 2004, p. 13. Geller quoted in Lightman and Brawer 1990, p. 340.
 1 1 . Dawkins, 2000, p. x.
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 needing some 'deeper' or 'higher' meaning to the world; in fact it is strik-
 ing that, for her, the existential question is one which is neither intelligible
 nor significant. These existential responses are not, I think, peculiar to a few
 'hardcore' naturalists, for many persons, it seems, simply do not experience the
 'terror' and 'vertigo' which, for John McDowell, should attend the realisation
 that human beliefs and concepts 'rest on nothing more' than our contingent
 'forms of life'.12 Certainly many persons do experience the 'vertigo' which
 McDowell gestures to, but many others do not , regarding that same fact - of
 the contingency of our biological nature, moral beliefs and forms of life - with
 indifference or insouciance.13
 The great difference between these existential responses to Darwinian nat-
 uralism can be brought out by considering them alongside Cottingham's and
 Holland's remarks on their sense of the 'bleakness' that it generates. Although
 they disagree on many points, they both agree that the 'world-picture' offered
 by Darwinian naturalism is characterised by 'bleakness'. So for Cottingham,
 humans appear as a 'by-product' of the 'vast ... ultimately random unrolling
 of brute contingency', crawling about within a world lacking 'any ultimate
 purpose' or, indeed, anything that 'could possibly be redemptive or salvific'.14
 Similarly for Holland, there is no 'respite from the random' in the Darwinian
 world, which is 'every bit as random, contingent, remorseless and bleak as
 Cottingham ... and others describe it to be.'15 Cottingham and Holland there-
 fore judge that the appropriate response to the 'bleakness' of the world as
 described by Darwinian naturalism is to seek some compensating belief or
 project - something 'redemptive or salvific', say - for otherwise one is left
 with a sense of alienation or despair. Bleakness is, then, for Cottingham and
 Holland, something that demands some response from human beings, for oth-
 erwise their lives will become unbearable.
 It is clear enough that Cottingham and Holland are here voicing sincere
 existential concerns, which are not just abstract technical quandaries about the
 ontology of value, but rather reflect deep and enduring concerns about the very
 possibility of one's living a meaningful life within the world as described by
 Darwinian naturalism. It is, moreover, precisely those concerns which cheerful
 naturalists, like Dawkins and Geller, do not share, for the sense of bleakness
 which reflection on them generates for Cottingham and Holland seems not to
 arise.
 12. McDowell 1998, pp. 212 and 207.
 13. See Kidd, forthcoming.
 14. Cottingham 201 1, p. 300.
 15. Holland 2009, p. 509.
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 2. TWO RESPONSES TO THE CHEERFUL NATURALIST
 The sincerity and depth of Cottingham's and Holland's existential concerns
 sits in striking contrast with the attitudes of those, like Dawkins and Geller, for
 who no such concerns obtain. Assuming that they agree on the relevant bio-
 logical and astrophysical facts, which I'll take it that they do, their responses
 differ enormously. Cottingham and Holland regard the brute contingencies of
 our fragile existence in a random universe as an impossibly bleak picture, one
 which demands response, either by appeal to a theism, for Cottingham, or in-
 vesting hopes in 'still and small and quiet' things, for Holland.16 But those
 same contingencies and fragilities elicit no such 'vertigo' from Dawkins and
 other naturalists, who feel that neither the integrity of our moral beliefs nor the
 meaningfulness of our lives is thus compromised, or even bruised.
 Such naturalists - assuming, as I do, that they are sincere - simply do not
 find themselves called to confront or cope with the existential challenge which
 Cottingham defines in terms of ' contingency , alienation , despair, failure and
 fragility '17 Since those naturalists are not troubled by the fact of their being
 'naked apes' resulting from an aimless evolutionary process, they do not feel
 alienated from the world and so no sense of bleakness arises. For they do not
 find themselves robbed of what Williams called that 'motive force' which,
 for other people, a meaningful life depends. Their cheerfulness, then, is not a
 stance of tactical optimism but rather a reflection of their being untroubled by
 the sorts of existential concerns which arise from a sense of bleakness. So this
 sort of naturalist is cheerful not because they judge it to be the best response
 to a bad situation, but because they do not feel themselves to be in a bad exis-
 tential situation at all.
 Such naturalists will therefore hardly find the 'bleakness charge' either
 compelling or perhaps even intelligible - as indeed many do not. Indeed, they
 will likely regard Holland's worry that Darwinian naturalism compromises
 'the very possibility of living a meaningful, and therefore worthwhile, life'
 as just peculiar, and his talk of the redemptive possibilities - like courageous
 'self-affirmation' - as either peculiar or just plain redundant.18 The question is
 therefore whether these existential responses to Darwinian naturalism ought
 to be taken seriously, and if so, what implications they have for the 'bleakness
 charge'.
 An obvious answer to that question is that those existential responses are,
 in fact, bogus. Although naturalists like Dawkins and Geller may cheerfully
 concede the contingency and fragility of our lives - the fact that we're ac-
 cidental products of a random system - they cannot, in fact, actually maintain
 that those concessions entail no existential alarm. If they fail to experience
 16. Holland 2009, 513.
 1 7. Cottingham 201 1 , p. 300-30 1 ff. See further Cottingham 2009.
 1 8. Holland 2009, pp. 503 and 5 1 6.
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 the sense of 'vertigo' that McDowell describes, then that indicates, not their
 defiant existential valour, but, rather, their imperfect understanding of the im-
 plications of their beliefs. Those cheerful naturalists are, then, guilty on one of
 two counts. Either they have failed to properly understand and appreciate the
 implications of the naturalistic cosmology they have embraced - in which case
 they are at cognitive fault; or they in fact have, but pretend that those implica-
 tions don't trouble them, or that they can cope with them. In the first case, the
 cheerful naturalist is guilty of ignorance, while in the second case they are,
 as Cooper puts it, guilty of hubris, for they attribute to themselves 'a capac-
 ity they do not have', namely of being able to cope with the conviction that
 their decisions and commitments have 'no further authority than their being
 the ones we happen to have made'.19
 Call these two responses to the cheerful naturalist the ignorance and the
 hubris objections, and let me take each in turn. It might be, in the first case,
 that when Dawkins and Geller insist that Darwinian naturalism affords 'deep
 refreshment' rather than bleakness, they are simply ignorant of certain facts
 about that doctrine; for instance, they may suppose that the 'brute contingency'
 does not compromise the integrity of our moral values when in fact it does, or
 they may not be sufficiently conversant of the philosophical complexities of
 the issues they raise to appreciate the 'bleak' implications of the naturalistic
 doctrine they cheerfully embrace. The adoption and embrace of cheerful forms
 of Darwinian naturalism is therefore premised upon an ignorance of the philo-
 sophical issues which motivate the bleakness charge, with the corollary that, if
 that ignorance were dispelled, bleakness would surely follow.
 The second response offered by Cooper is cast in terms of what he calls a
 'posture of hubris'. A person guilty of adopting a posture of hubris is one who
 'aspire[s] to live in the recognition that, ultimately, their beliefs and values
 "lean on nothing" beyond themselves', and that, in fact, no such external or ob-
 jective measure is necessary, or perhaps even possible.20 Cooper stresses that
 a person occupying a posture of hubris is 'refusing to ... rely in any way' on
 something 'that he cannot really do without'.21 The cheerful naturalist would
 be guilty of adopting a posture of hubris, because they pretend to be able to en-
 tertain commitments and claims - specifically, that the life they are leading is
 a meaningful one - which they cannot, in fact, maintain, given the conception
 of reality they have adopted. By cheerfully insisting that meaningful lives are
 possible in conjunction with a commitment to Darwinian naturalism, figures
 like Dawkins and Geller are therefore guilty either of ignorance or of hubris:
 for they are either ignorant of, or deny, their need for some degree of measure
 which their metaphysical commitments do not and cannot provide.
 19. Cooper 2009, p. 53. Specifically, of what Cooper dubs hubris of posture.
 20. Cooper 2002, p. 2 1 0.
 2 1 . Cooper 2002, p. 1 63.
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 It is worthwhile explaining further how cheerful naturalism invites the
 charge of postural hubris which Cooper offers. That task can be taken in four
 parts, each taken from Cooper's own discussion, of which the following ac-
 count is only a summaiy.22 First, human beings need to find and understand
 their lives, at least in substantial part, as significant or meaningful. Second,
 assigning significance to some features or aspects of one's life requires one
 to identify its 'appropriate connection with', or contribution to, 'something
 beyond itself' - some wider project or activity in virtue of which its meaning-
 fulness or significance can be determined. To take an easy example, writing
 an academic paper may be judged valuable in light of the wider project of
 pursuing philosophical understanding. Third, one must be able to judge how
 and when these chains of significance stop, without that judgement rendering
 pointless the activities whose significance was being scrutinised; otherwise
 the purpose for which those chains were traced is compromised. Fourth, then,
 Cooper argues that the chain of significance cannot stop within the range of
 human 'practices, forms of life, traditions [and] personal commitments', for
 these still admit of the question of their meaningfulness, for they defer it to
 wider and wider sets of commitments and activities - from one's own philo-
 sophical activities, to the activities constitutive of the tradition of philosophy,
 and so on.
 With this argument in place, Cooper insists that the significance of our
 human practices, values, and activities must lie beyond the human, for what-
 ever remains within the precincts of the human always inspires the question
 of its own significance. The cheerful naturalist, of course, agrees there is
 something 'beyond the human', namely the world as described by the natural
 sciences - including but not limited to biology; however, that is not a concep-
 tion of reality which can render meaningful or significant human activities,
 for, to quote Geller again, it is 'just a physical system'. There is therefore no
 reason for cheerfulness, for the cheerful naturalist who raised the question of
 the meaningfulness of their activities - whether scientific enquiry, personal
 friendships or whatever - will find that their 'chains of significance' come to
 an end in a cosmos which cannot intelligibly be judged to provide the sort of
 'measure' that Cooper has in mind.
 Instead, that cheerful naturalist is confronted with what Cottingham and
 Holland - to recall remarks quoted earlier - described as a 'vast . . . ultimately
 random unrolling of brute contingency' which affords no 'respite from the
 random'. Once this process of philosophical reflection has been completed,
 the charge of ignorance dissolves, because the cheerful naturalist has been
 acquainted with the relevant kind and degree of understanding necessary to
 appreciate the charge of bleakness. But of course, the charge of ignorance is
 quickly exchanged for the charge of postural hubris, for the cheerful naturalist
 cannot provide an account of why their activities matter, for to do that, they
 22. See Cooper 2002, pp. 266-276 and, further, Cooper 2009.
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 require a measure by which to determine the significance of their practices,
 activities and commitments which their conception of reality cannot provide.
 Cooper, of course, argues that the cheerful naturalist can do one of two things
 at this point. Either they can concede their need for some 'compensating' be-
 liefs or convictions - and I leave off discussion of his own complex proposals
 for what they might be23 - or they defiantly deny their need for such com-
 pensations, insisting, instead, that they are exempted from the need for it. At
 that point, they become 'properly' guilty of hubris, for they thereby pretend to
 possess a capacity - that of living without a 'measure' for the meaningfulness
 of their commitments - which they in fact lack and which, in fact, no human
 being does or could possess.
 3. COULD SOME PERSONS COPE WITH BLEAKNESS?
 Considering these thoughts of Cooper's therefore offers two responses to the
 cheerful naturalist: either they are guilty of ignorance or guilty of hubris. To
 take Dawkins and Geller as examples, one can therefore argue that either they
 have failed to realise the existential implications of their commitments, or that
 they have hubristically supposed that they can cope with them, when, in fact,
 they cannot.
 These two charges between them place the cheerful naturalist in a difficult
 position. If one presumes that they regard their lives as meaningful - which
 is plausible enough - then their indifference to the existential worries that
 Cottingham and Holland raise is a sign of 'bad faith', in Sartre's sense. For
 if they were to properly reflect on the existential implications of Darwinian
 naturalism, their confident immunity to the bleakness charge would dis-
 solve, leaving them in the state of 'vertigo' within which one then needs, as
 Cottingham and Holland point out, to seek some redemptive solution - an
 embrace of theism, or gentle hopefulness, or whatever.
 The charge as it stands, then, is that the cheerful naturalist who disavows
 the bleakness charge and insists that an awareness of the 'brute contingency'
 and 'randomness' of the world does not trouble them, is, in fact, either ignorant
 or imperfectly appreciative of the implications of that awareness. Although
 the foregoing appeal to Cooper's charge of hubris adds further complications
 to an already complicated issue, it does, I think, help to clarify what I take to
 be a deeply important issue concerning the bleakness charge, namely: might
 it be the case that certain persons are in fact capable of simultaneously find-
 ing meaningful their activities and commitments (and indeed their life) while
 also embracing doctrines like Darwinian naturalism which do not themselves
 provide any 'measure' for their meaningfulness?
 23. See, for instance, Cooper 2002, ch. 1 3.
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 That rather complex question can be unpacked in the following way.
 Cottingham and Holland identify the bleakness charge as an important prob-
 lem for Darwinian naturalism, but of course will likely find it difficult to
 persuade those who cheerfully deny the charge that there is, in fact, any prob-
 lem to be had. It is likely, in my judgement, that 'doubters' will fall into one of
 two camps; first, those who don't find Darwinian naturalism 'bleak' but would
 if they reflected upon it, and, second, those who don't find it 'bleak' and still
 wouldn't even after prolonged reflection and deliberation. The first group of
 'doubters' are guilty of ignorance and, were they properly availed of relevant
 understanding, would quickly concede the bleakness charge - thereby also
 evading the charge of hubris. Such persons may therefore initially report no
 sense of existential anxiety in the face of Darwinian naturalism, but, of course,
 an appreciation of bleakness is their rather unpleasant reward for reflecting
 critically upon its existential implications, if indeed they do.
 The second group of 'doubters' are those whom Cooper would charge with
 hubris. For they are not ignorant of the philosophical concerns motivating the
 bleakness charge, but insist that they can, in fact, live without any compensat-
 ing 'measure', thereby embracing, rather than seeking to evade, the charge
 of hubris. Such defiantly cheerful naturalists are those for whom Darwinian
 naturalism is, to use Dawkins' term, 'refreshing', rather than bleak, alienating
 and a cause for existential despair. My question of whether certain persons can
 simultaneously embrace Darwinian naturalism and still find their lives genu-
 inely meaningful, rather than bleak, is therefore directed at the persons in this
 second group.
 Is it perhaps possible that certain people - these defiantly cheerful natural-
 ists - are, in fact, genuinely immune to a sense of bleakness? These would be
 persons who accept Darwinian naturalism and come to a reflective appreciation
 of its existential implications, avail themselves of the relevant philosophical is-
 sues, and so on, yet who still, at the end of all of that, genuinely experience
 no sense of bleakness, 'vertigo', or meaninglessness. Such persons clearly are
 not guilty of ignorance, although it may be an open question as to whether
 they are guilty of hubris, of claiming to possess a capacity they lack. It strikes
 me as overly presumptive to suggest that a person could not, in fact, regard
 Darwinian naturalism as existentially sufficient, especially since one cannot
 foreclose the possibility of there being sufficiently informed and reflective per-
 sons who might claim to occupy that position. Such persons may be very few
 in number, but, of course, their rarity would be a proof of, not an argument
 against, their possibility; the question is, though, whether such existential self-
 sufficiency is in fact a possibility or not.
 Certainly the idea that certain persons are immune to the bleakness charge
 is an intriguing one, but let me offer just two ways of thinking about that claim.
 These two proposals are not exhaustive, but are simply offered as ways to go
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 about asking and, hopefully, answering that question: let me call them the his -
 toricist and the ahistoricist strategies and take each in turn.
 The historicist approach to the question of whether certain persons may
 be immune to bleakness focuses on the possibility of an historical develop-
 ment in human existential capacities. The historicist may be sympathetic to the
 thought, voiced by Cottingham and Holland, that human flourishing requires
 a more existentially responsive conception of reality than that of Darwinian
 naturalism, but they think that there are good reasons to take seriously the
 idea that, in fact, certain persons do not share that requirement. Nietzsche,
 of course, took that claim seriously, for his Overman is the legislator of his
 own 'table of values' and regards the 'death of God' as joyous emancipation.
 But even less polemical authors, like Charles Taylor, have speculated that the
 'modern . . . self is coming to enjoy a 'very different existential condition', one
 capable of 'disengaging from everything' - from both 'cosmos and God' - and
 becoming 'master of the meanings of things . . . giving [his] own autonomous
 order to [his] life'.24 If this is the case, then the 'bleakness charge' may be a
 phenomenon of a transitory stage in our history, in which our existential sensi-
 bilities are adjusting from predominantly theological cosmologies - of the sort
 Taylor describes - to the naturalistic ones whose early chorus members may
 be Dawkins and Geller.
 The historicist therefore takes seriously the idea that the charge of hubris is
 a creature of history, because the 'modern self' whose emergence Taylor docu-
 ments is, in fact, capable of living without the measure described by Cooper.
 Such a creature would, as Richard Rorty puts it, genuinely rest content with
 'obedience to [their] own conventions' and who, in the words of the novelist
 Alain Robbe-Grillet, 'no longer feels the absence of meaning as a lack [and]
 succumbs to no dizziness'.25 Those two figures, and their claims, are quoted
 and discussed by Cooper in the context of his own discussion of the possibil-
 ity of 'modern selves' freed or liberated from the need for measure - and he
 is, of course, critical of their claims. Now, not everyone will be persuaded by
 Cooper's charge of hubris against figures such as Rorty and Robbe-Grillet,
 nor by his account of our need for 'measure' to protect us against vulnerability
 to bleakness; however, the historicist claim that, in fact, certain persons may
 be the beneficiaries of a developing capacity for existential self-sufficiency is
 worth taking seriously, if only as a new strategy for combating those who claim
 immunity to bleakness.
 The ahistoricist approach is perhaps predictably opposed to any talk of
 maturing or evolving capacities and powers, interpreting this instead as just
 the latest stage in longstanding tendencies of human beings, perhaps since
 antiquity, towards ignorance and hubris. A recent defence of the ahistoricist
 approach to the purported evolution of our existential responses to naturalistic
 24. Taylor 2007, pp. 38-41 passim.
 25. Quoted in Cooper 2002, 1 56-1 57 and 265, respectively.
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 cosmologies, such as Darwinian naturalism, was offered by Paul Feyerabend.
 The title of his final book, Conquest of Abundance, refers to what Feyerabend
 sees as a historical trend, beginning in ancient Greece, which is resulting in the
 gradual dissolution of the rich diversity of ways of conceiving of and living
 within the world evident across human history - magical, theological, scien-
 tific and so on. The fact that human beings can, and indeed have, developed
 these different ways of 'approaching' reality indicates that we are not 'aliens
 [but rather] natural inhabitants' of the world, capable of living meaningful
 lives within its 'abundance' - but if only we employ conceptions of reality suf-
 ficiently 'responsive' to our existential needs.26
 Feyerabend shares Cottingham and Holland's concern with the bleakness of
 naturalistic cosmologies. Many of his later works address the question of how
 world-pictures - like Darwinian naturalism - which 'reduce abundance and
 devalue human existence', can become 'powerful [and] plausible', especially
 given that their consequences have been to render human life 'disorienting]
 . . . scattered [and] aimless'.27 Confident talk of growing immunity to bleakness
 should, argues Feyerabend, be interpreted in terms of long-standing cultural
 and intellectual tendencies which erode our existential sensibilities, especially
 a 'general movement towards abstractness and monotony' which sees the rich-
 ness and diversity of human experience gradually dissolved, thereby depriving
 us of 'important ingredients of a rewarding human life'.28
 There is much to consider in Feyerabend's complex historical and philo-
 sophical claims about the 'conquest of abundance', which deserves sustained
 treatment in its own right. It is, however, worth noting just two useful points
 about it.
 The first is its implication that those confident 'modern selves' described
 by Rorty and Robbe-Grillet are, in fact, ignorant of their status as occupants of
 a certain historical legacy. 'Even an excessively reflective agent is never fully
 in control' of their convictions, writes Feyerabend, for they are 'already sail-
 ing along with one of the tendencies, which means that her choice will appear
 to her not as a choice but simply as a step on the road to truth'.29 Put another
 way, there is no reason to suppose that cheerful naturalists enjoy a privileged
 epistemic perspective upon their history - one which justifies their claim to be
 the beneficiaries of emerging and enriched existential capacities. Indeed, there
 is hubris in their claim to be able to determine that their cheerful immunity
 to bleakness is just that - a newly-gained capacity - rather than just the latest
 example of longer historical tendencies towards ignorance and hubris.
 The second point to take from Feyerabend is that reflection on history,
 whether in terms of his 'conquest of abundance' narrative or not, may temper
 26. Feyerabend 2001, pp. 167 and 195. See further Kidd 2013b.
 27. Feyerabend 2001 , pp. 16 and 246.
 28. Feyerabend 2001 , pp. 198 and 269.
 29. Feyerabend 2001, p. 85.
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 confident claims about newly-emerging existential capacities. To take just one
 example, in his most recent book Cooper discusses humans' relationship to
 nature, identifying a series of 'moods' - of yearning, nostalgia, disillusion and
 a feeling for mystery - which accompany the atrophy of our sense of conver-
 gence with nature; the sense, for instance, of a lost 'oneness' with nature.30
 Although those moods are familiar from the literature on contemporary human
 beings' estrangement from nature, as a result of technology or the disenchant-
 ment effected by the scientific worldview, Cooper demonstrates that, in fact,
 they were also recognised by Daoists from the fifth century BCE onwards.
 Bleakness is, then, perhaps an enduring feature of human reflection upon the
 meaningfulness of their lives, rather than a passing phase in the history of
 those reflections. Indeed, debates about the bleakness of naturalistic cosmolo-
 gies are hardly the special preserve of late modernity, with its industry and
 science, but have, perhaps, been enduring features of human beings' efforts to
 understand the possibility of a meaningful life within the world.
 4. CONCLUSIONS
 The historicist and ahistoricist approaches to the question of whether certain
 human beings could in fact enjoy a maturing immunity to the bleakness charge
 offer up large areas of further enquiry. Certainly the remarks offered here, in-
 cluding the appeals to Cooper and Feyerabend, offer problems and possibilities
 rather than solutions, thereby making the original debate between Cottingham
 and Holland more, rather than less, difficult. Such worries are, however, oc-
 cupational hazards of philosophising, but let me close with three suggestions
 which might aid further discussions. The first is that is the charges of ignorance
 and hubris offer useful ways of critically engaging with the cheerful naturalist,
 including new ways of trying to understand their claims about why, if at all,
 naturalism is not bleak.
 The second is the possibility - even if it is only that - of a growing capacity,
 amongst certain persons at least, for existential self-sufficiency, one becoming
 visible in the ostensibly hubristic rhetoric of many contemporary figures, like
 Rorty and Dawkins. If that possibility is a genuine one, it allows for a much
 greater variety of ways of authentically conceiving of and comporting oneself
 within the world may be possible than Cottingham and Holland admit. At the
 least, further understanding of those for whom the 'bleakness charge' does not
 arise may be instructive for those of us for whom it does.
 The third suggestion is the issue at stake in the debate between the his-
 toricist and the ahistoricist; namely, of whether persons susceptible to the
 bleakness charge are, in fact, inheritors of an older set of existential orienta-
 tions which are destined to take their place alongside, if not be replaced by, the
 30. Cooper 2012, p. 12.
 Environmental Values 22.6
This content downloaded from 
            128.243.44.244 on Sat, 09 Jan 2021 00:18:57 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 701
 IS NATURALISM BLEAK?
 'modern self' described by Taylor and others. Whether that would indicate the
 ongoing atrophy of our sensibilities - as Cooper and Feyerabend believe - or
 the maturation of our existential self-sufficiency is a topic worthy of further
 consideration.
 REFERENCES
 Cooper, D.E. 2002. The Measure of Things: Humanism, Humility, and Mystery. Oxford:
 Clarendon Press.
 Cooper, D.E. 2009. 'Mystery, world and religion'. In J. Cornwell and M. McGhee
 (eds.), Philosophers and God: On the Frontiers of Faith and Reason , pp. 51-62.
 London: Continuum.
 Cooper, D.E. 2012. Convergence with Nature: A Daoist Perspective. Dartington: Green
 Books.
 Cottingham, J. 2009. The good life and the "radical contingency of the ethical'". In D.
 Calicut (ed.), Reading Bernard Williams , pp. 24-42. London: Routledge.
 Cottingham, J. 2011. Reply to Holland: The meaning of life and Darwinism .
 Environmental Values 20: 299-308. CrossRef
 Darwin, C. 1859 [2009]. The Origin of Species: By Means of Natural Selection, or the
 Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life , edited by Jim Endersby.
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 Dawkins, R. 2000. Unweaving The Rainbow: Science, Delusion, and the Appetite for
 Wonder. New York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt.
 Dawkins, R. 2004. A Devil s Chaplain: Reflections on Hope, Lies, Science, and Love.
 New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
 Feyerabend, P. 2001 . Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction versus the Richness
 of Being, edited by B. Terpestra. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
 Holland, A. 2009. 'Darwin and the meaning in life'. Environmental Values 18: SOS-
 SIS. CrossRef
 Holland, A. 2011. 'What do we do about bleakness?'. Environmental Values 20: 3 15-
 321. CrossRef
 Kidd, I.J. 2013a. 'A phenomenological challenge to "enlightened secularism'",
 Religious Studies 49: 377-398.
 Kidd, I.J. 2013b. 'Feyerabend on the ineffability of reality'. In A. Kasher and J. Diller
 (eds.), Models of God and Other Ultimate Realities , pp. 849-860. Dordrecht:
 Kluwer. CrossRef
 Kidd, I.J. forthcoming. 'Emotion, religious practice, and cosmopolitan secularism'.
 Religious Studies.
 Lightman, A. and R. Brawer (eds.) 1990. Origins: The Lives and Worlds of Modern
 Cosmologists. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
 McDowell, J. 1998. Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
 Press.
 Environmental Values 22.6
This content downloaded from 
            128.243.44.244 on Sat, 0fff on Thu, 01 Jan 1976 12:34:56 UTC 
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 702
 IAN JAMES KIDD
 Ratcliffe, M. 2012. 'What is it to lose hope?', Phenomenology and the Cognitive
 Sciences , in press.
 Taylor, C. 2007. A Secular Age. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
 Williams, B. 1981. Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 Environmental Values 22.6
This content downloaded from 
            128.243.44.244 on Sat, 09 Jan 2021 00:18:57 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
